EU countries shoot themselves in the foot when they veto sanctions - FT中文网
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EU countries shoot themselves in the foot when they veto sanctions

A recent move by France makes talk of ‘strategic autonomy’ look like hot air
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{"text":[[{"start":6.5,"text":"It is not a pretty picture: the country that has been most insistent that EU member states develop “strategic autonomy” from global powers recently forced the bloc to submit to pressure from a middling Central Asian authoritarian petrostate."}],[{"start":20.3,"text":"Last month, France held up the six-monthly renewal of sanctions on individuals and companies linked to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime. The EU’s foreign policy rules require unanimity for decisions on sanctions. Paris, however, threatened to allow all the sanctions to lapse unless the billionaire Alisher Usmanov was removed from the list. This, it seems, was a condition set by Azerbaijan for the release of French citizens imprisoned there. Luxembourg then followed with a demand to take another oligarch off the hook."}],[{"start":51.25,"text":"This is not the first betrayal of European solidarity over sanctions. Greece this year held up a previous sanctions renewal to allow a shipping magnate to continue the very lucrative business of shipping Russian gas to non-EU markets. Hungary has long used its veto power for its own benefit."}],[{"start":70.6,"text":"But for France to behave in this way is a watershed. It is one of the founders of the EU and its second-largest member state. And President Emmanuel Macron’s call for strategic autonomy, at first dismissed as a French idée fixe, had more or less become conventional wisdom in the bloc. Now, however, it looks as though it was just talk."}],[{"start":91.85,"text":"In the end France — or rather, Azerbaijan — got its way. Baku promptly released one French prisoner after EU governments struck a compromise in which the remaining sanctions were extended for three years rather than just six months. That, at least, means a repeat will not happen any time soon. But what matters more is how much of the EU’s geopolitical influence, such as it was, has been lost in the process."}],[{"start":118.19999999999999,"text":"Paris has in effect put the position of EU capitals on sanctions up for sale to third countries. Quite aside from undermining the “common” in the EU’s common security and defence policy, this further encourages rogue states to hold European countries to ransom, for example by jailing their citizens."}],[{"start":136.85,"text":"The even bigger loss is the potential for a more strategic sanctions policy, which now seems further from being realised than ever. To give credit where it’s due: the EU has managed to assemble an impressive 21 sanctions packages against Russia. These have hurt the Russian economy and shrunk the resources available to sustain its war effort. But the EU should aim higher than the reactive punishment it has meted out, partially and too weakly enforced. "}],[{"start":163.29999999999998,"text":"A truly strategic sanctions policy deliberately links sanctions decisions to demands made of others. That requires the ability to credibly threaten specific sanctions (or the tightening of existing ones) before other states act to harm EU values or interests, and to promise loosening on strict conditions. Such an ability is elusive while 27 veto-wielding member states all pursue their own narrow goals — but it would earn Europe a seat at the table when Ukraine’s future is determined and give it greater influence on Israel’s conduct in the Middle East. On top of boosting the EU’s strategic relevance, that would also serve its economic interests."}],[{"start":202.5,"text":"The path to achieving this is well known: it is to shift sanctions and possibly other aspects of foreign policy to qualified majority voting (QMV), as provided for in the EU treaties. The last push to do so was a “friends of QMV” group of member states formed a few years ago. Ironically enough, France joined the group, although it is doubtful its heart was ever in it. "}],[{"start":226.85,"text":"Unfortunately, the current prospects for such a move, which itself requires unanimity, are poor. However, now that the existing procedure is being undermined, the need for it is greater than ever."}],[{"start":238.9,"text":"Some member states fear that their vital interests would be damaged by majority rulemaking. But in a world suddenly more filled with adversaries and enemies, going it alone is to accept being divided and ruled by others — even for the biggest countries, as the French experience shows. "}],[{"start":255.55,"text":"EU countries should remember that it is precisely when majority rulemaking has stopped them from undercutting each other commercially — in trade, competition and the single market — that they have flourished collectively. "}],[{"start":268.05,"text":"Majority voting on sanctions would not by itself improve policy. Brussels’ pusillanimity in robustly using the EU’s anti-coercion instrument, or even conventional trade policy, against the US or China shows that. But it is a necessary condition for progress. Macron could redeem himself by rallying behind a shift now."}],[{"start":296.3,"text":""}]],"url":"https://audio.ftcn.net.cn/album/a_1791182386_2823.mp3"}

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