{"text":[[{"start":5.7,"text":"The writer is an FT contributing editor, a visiting scholar at the Hoover Institution and author of a forthcoming book on globalisation"}],[{"start":14.12,"text":"As the midterms approach, how is the Trump administration’s foreign policy performing? The answer will influence decision making in the second half of his term and the policies of his successor in 2029. A revealing exercise is to attempt to evaluate success on the White House’s own terms. Rather than isolationism, the administration exhibits a desire to ensure America “gets paid” for its superpower status by maximising its cash flow and assets; a belief it can cut defence obligations without triggering a world war; and an assumption that other countries will suck it up. Values such as human rights and loyalty are peripheral."}],[{"start":53.4,"text":"The goal of monetising superpower status offends liberal values and orthodox economics but is not new. Many empires evaluated themselves in this way. Richard Nixon justified the 1971 shock in similar terms. As he ended the dollar’s convertibility into gold, taxed imports and demanded allies pay up for defence, he declared the US no longer had “one hand tied behind her back”. Donald Trump’s demands for purchases and investment quotas — tribute payments — from foreigners reflect a kindred instinct. The administration’s officials and entourage of tycoons speak of “dominance” in tech, finance, energy and arms, with the US as the pre-eminent global supplier."}],[{"start":95.56,"text":"One Trumpian key performance indicator is what you might call the national cash flow statement. Gross payments entering America of all kinds hit a huge 30 per cent of GDP in the second quarter. Reflecting the aim of monetisation, not autarky, America is more globalised than at almost any point in history other than the prelude to the 2007-09 crisis. Energy exports have exploded. Weapons sales overseas are rising at a double-digit rate. Tech and financial firms are printing money abroad. Capital inflows, mainly from portfolios, loans and firms, are staggering, although exceeded as a share of GDP by the pre-2007 mania."}],[{"start":135.56,"text":"While America is now spending almost as much on AI chips and tech hardware imports as on defence, the current account deficit has eased to 3 per cent of GDP. The payments of all kinds leaving the US must balance those entering, but investment outflows are often orchestrated by Wall Street, boosting the US’s role as the world epicentre of capital allocation."}],[{"start":158.54,"text":"The catch is that this formula has not won over voters. While the Iran shock has benefited America at a national level, with a record net energy surplus, and tariffs have a modest influence on output, both have raised inflation, angering voters who also fear AI will kill jobs and raise electricity bills. Distributionally, profits have surged as a share of GDP, and wages have fallen. Monetising America has pleased tycoons, but not citizens."}],[{"start":187.48,"text":"The next KPI is war and peace. Convinced America is overstretched and exploited, the Trumpian impulse has been to re-arm, use hard power selectively, dilute defence guarantees and seek stability with major military rivals China and Russia. Iran illustrates US incompetence and inadequate weapons stocks, but also the relative indifference of US elite and public opinion to disorder abroad and letting down client states who are not treaty allies. Saudi Arabia has resorted to asking Pakistan and Britain for help. The approach of weakening commitments to Ukraine, Nato and Asian allies, while co-operating with autocracies, has so far avoided triggering a wider war. Next month could see a summit between Trump, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin."}],[{"start":234.16,"text":"The last KPI is whether other countries are sucking it up. Mistreated India is trying to close a US trade deal. Marco Rubio, the secretary of state, has just visited a refinery there that can handle heavy crude from the new US protectorate, Venezuela. Leaders such as Sanae Takaichi of Japan are deferential. The dollar has risen this year and France shows that other powers are unstable."}],[{"start":257.32,"text":"What should one conclude from this exercise? First, the Trump administration will not view the past two years as a failure. Second, these dynamics may deteriorate in the next two. If the AI boom fades, growth and capital inflows will slow, making it harder to plug the fiscal deficit, while voters’ disgruntlement may continue. China and Russia have an opportunity to take military risks, with US alliances weakened, rearmament slowed by Iran and, post-midterms, a hostile Congress. Allies are building capabilities to cut reliance on the US, which just threatened “devastating” retaliation if Europe favours local satellite companies over Starlink. In India this week, Jio launched a $110bn flotation, with proposals for a 1,600 “sovereign” satellite array."}],[{"start":305.56,"text":"The final conclusion is that the administration will not reverse course, but double down. That would mean unorthodox interventions to make voters feel better off: Nixon tried price controls; Trump has suggested a $5,000 per person dividend if Republicans win. It could mean more concessions to placate China and Russia in the name of stability. And it means confrontations with allies over their attempts to build a plan B. Scored according to its own rationale, the first half has not been a failure, which almost guarantees the second will be no less dangerous."}],[{"start":340.48,"text":""}]],"url":"https://audio.ftcn.net.cn/album/a_1792840677_8250.mp3"}