The Ukraine war will shape the world

{"text":[[{"start":null,"text":"

"}],[{"start":5.04,"text":"The outcome of the war in Ukraine might shape not just the future of Ukraine, but of European liberal democracy itself. This may seem an excessive claim, but it is not."}],[{"start":16.77,"text":"First and most obviously, Ukraine is fighting for the right of a people to choose their own fate. Russia is an autocracy, as it has always been, ruled by a president whose will is law. Ukrainians are fighting with great skill and courage for freedom from such tyranny and so to make their own choice of direction."}],[{"start":null,"text":""}],[{"start":40.620000000000005,"text":"Second, as Fiona Hill and Angela Stent put it in an article in Foreign Affairs in 2022, Vladimir Putin “ordered his ‘special military operation’ because he believes that it is Russia’s divine right to rule Ukraine, to wipe out the country’s national identity, and to integrate its people into a Greater Russia”. Europeans must remember that their continent is criss-crossed with similarly contested borders. Once that Pandora’s box is opened, who will close it, especially as Putin’s political fifth column comes ever closer to power across the continent?"}],[{"start":79.2,"text":"Third, Ukraine is fighting a power intent on dominating Europe. A victorious Russia would be the biggest military power in Europe, directly threatening neighbouring members of Nato and the EU. With the US increasingly indifferent to the fate of the continent, this would leave Europe both scared and weak."}],[{"start":null,"text":""}],[{"start":100.65,"text":"Last but not least, if the Europeans fail to act effectively, the US stands aside, and the axis of Russia, China and North Korea wins, what will happen to the balance of forces and ideas across the globe? Who will believe in — or trust — those who claim to uphold freedom and democracy when they are prepared to shrug as these ideals are brutally expunged on their very borders."}],[{"start":129.65,"text":"Yet all is very far from lost. Crucially, the war has been going on for almost three and a half years. Yet, according to a June report by the Center for International and Strategic Studies, Russia has gained less than 1 per cent of Ukraine’s territory since 2024. It adds that “Russia has suffered roughly five times as many fatalities in Ukraine as in all Russian and Soviet wars combined” between the end of the second world war and the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022. Putin thought it would be a walkover. How wrong that tyrant was!"}],[{"start":null,"text":""}],[{"start":174.08,"text":"At the same time, conversations with informed outsiders in Ukraine make it evident that, in the words of one, “the situation is precarious”. The people are exhausted, nevertheless they fight on. What is more, they fight for all of us in the west. We must not repeat the mistakes of the appeasers before the second world war. We must at least give Ukraine the resources it needs."}],[{"start":200.88000000000002,"text":"This cannot be impossible. Russia has been unable to win so far, despite having a population almost four times as big as that of Ukraine and a GDP (at purchasing power parity) more than 10 times as large. There is also some reason to believe the Russian economy is more stressed than its authorities admit. The Swedish finance ministry tells me they think the Russian government’s own figures for inflation are far higher than the ones they publish. That might help explain why the central bank policy rate is 20 per cent while inflation is officially nearly 10 per cent."}],[{"start":null,"text":""}],[{"start":237.61,"text":"Above all, the population and GDP (at PPP) of the EU, plus UK, are 3.5 times and 4.8 times as big as Russia’s, respectively. In such a well-matched military contest, resources could be decisive. But have they given enough? The Ukraine Support Tracker from the Kiel Institute for the World Economy suggests not."}],[{"start":261.69,"text":"Up to this year, the Europeans (EU plus UK) gave similar amounts to the US. Since then, the US has stopped providing funds, arguing that the Europeans should pay. In the short term, just a few countries have filled this gap. But that needs to be regularised. Hitherto, European governments spent just 0.1 per cent of annual GDP on bilateral aid for Ukraine. At the very least, they need to double this at once. This would still be less than half of what Denmark and the Baltics are doing and much the same as Poland and the Netherlands."}],[{"start":null,"text":""}],[{"start":301.32,"text":"If this overall target is to be met, the larger countries must give significantly more, notably France, Italy and Spain. Yet, crucially, this should not be hard. Thus far, Germany has mobilised just 0.13 per cent of GDP — a trivial amount, given what is at stake. France gives less than half of that. Both could and should offer much more. So could others."}],[{"start":330.45,"text":"US military equipment, especially offensive equipment, is also of vital importance. The Europeans will have to produce more themselves, finance Ukraine’s production and buy directly from the US. Donald Trump’s recent falling out with Putin might help here."}],[{"start":null,"text":""}],[{"start":349.65,"text":"The only gain from the horrors of 2025 is the clarification they have brought. We know now — perhaps even Trump knows — that Putin is interested only in winning at the negotiating table what he has been unable to win on the battlefield. Europeans also know that Trump’s US is an unreliable ally, but it may be cajoled, or bought, into providing what is needed. They must know, too, that their future depends increasingly on themselves, though, in the case of Ukraine, with the help, as well, of international institutions, notably the IMF. They must know, not least, that the issue is not one of resources, but of will and time. They must mobilise whatever is needed to prove to Russians that they will not be allowed to win and to Ukrainians that they are reliable allies."}],[{"start":410.2,"text":"As in the 1930s, the decisions made now could shape the future of the continent and even of the world for generations. I am not optimistic. But of one thing I am sure: if democratic Europe cannot act in concert now, it is doomed."}],[{"start":434.08,"text":""}]],"url":"https://audio.ftmailbox.cn/album/a_1753356706_3952.mp3"}