Forget the ‘special relationship’ — Britain needs to be more transactional

{"text":[[{"start":null,"text":"

"}],[{"start":8.49,"text":"The writer was UK ambassador to the US, 2012-16"}],[{"start":14.68,"text":"For more than 80 years the relationship between Britain and the United States has been endlessly described as special. The term has served us both pretty well. Washington would call on the “special relationship” when requiring a particular favour of the British government, as in Afghanistan after 9/11 or in Iraq in 2003; the UK cites it when describing our close defence and intelligence links, US support for our nuclear deterrent, the closeness of our commercial relations, and our common language. Or when feeling unloved by closer neighbours."}],[{"start":55.38,"text":"But it hasn’t been faultless. Harold Wilson memorably declined to send British troops to Vietnam. In the sterling crises of 1967 and 1976, Washington declined to support the pound. In the Falklands war of 1982 the US would not support the right of the inhabitants to self-determination. In 1994, Bill Clinton infuriated the government of John Major by granting a visa to Gerry Adams before the IRA had renounced the use of violence."}],[{"start":88.82,"text":"Before the 2016 referendum, Barack Obama warned against Brexit and said the UK would be “at the back of the queue” if it came to negotiating a trade agreement from outside the EU. Donald Trump did Theresa May no favours two years later when he criticised her negotiating stance during an official state visit. And when Trump returned to the White House in January and went all out with “reciprocal” tariffs there was little sign of any special relationship favouring the UK."}],[{"start":122.57,"text":"Things looked up when Keir Starmer visited the Oval Office in February and secured a promise of favourable treatment, leading to an agreement on better treatment of both countries’ exports in May. What made the difference? Partly, highly effective staff work by the No 10 team ensuring that the chemistry between president and prime minister was good. Partly, Trump’s affection for the UK thanks to his mother’s Scottish roots. But mainly Starmer’s production of a letter signed by the King inviting him to pay an unprecedented second state visit."}],[{"start":158.41,"text":"All this helped bilateral relations and the atmospherics of the trade negotiations (which have yet to conclude). But neither Starmer’s successful visit, nor his rushed return to Washington with other European leaders to try and shore up the US position on Ukraine after Putin’s red carpet treatment in Alaska, made any difference to the most important item on the UK’s foreign policy agenda: Trump’s acquiescence in Russia’s continuing invasion of Ukraine."}],[{"start":189.55,"text":"No doubt every effort will be made this week to advance national interests and bilateral partnerships. But what if no progress is made at the Windsor Castle state dinner and Chequers talks, even while avoiding difficult subjects where there is no prospect of agreement?  "}],[{"start":207.39000000000001,"text":"Trump is proudly transactional, so is it perhaps time for the UK to behave similarly, to seek leverage, to make deals? There is no leverage now to be gained from the state visit. It was offered gratis, because the calculation was made in No 10 that there was no time to be lost in using soft power as a means of nudging Trump into a better position on issues of major importance to a new British government with, as the president himself might put it, few other cards to play."}],[{"start":241.14000000000001,"text":"But if we are prepared to be more transactional, there may in fact be other cards to play. The UK has gone to great lengths, and expenditure to ensure that the US can continue to use Diego Garcia as a strategic base in the Indian Ocean for the foreseeable future. We provide vital intelligence and defence facilities to the US in several other Overseas Territories and across the UK. Trump says he is fed up with picking up the tab for European defence. But these are assets that are directly relevant to the defence of the territorial US, not that of Europe."}],[{"start":281.63,"text":"Trump, rightly, has made a big issue of the need for European members of Nato to upgrade their defensive capabilities. That will mean a lot of expensive new equipment. The UK will instinctively spend billions on US weapons and is already partners with the US and Australia in the Aukus project. But if the US is going to be less committed to Europe’s defence in future, and to keep applying its own conditions to equipment, why wouldn’t the Europeans make a better fist of pooling their resources and invest in new defensive capabilities of their own? "}],[{"start":316.61,"text":"The UK and its European partners should keep in mind that not everything Trump believes in will disappear when he leaves the scene. The Biden administration was in no rush to dismantle the tariffs Trump applied in his first term. “America First” has appeal that goes far wider than Maga true believers. The US has always been transactional. It may be time we learn to be too."}],[{"start":350.44,"text":""}]],"url":"https://audio.ftmailbox.cn/album/a_1758156914_6264.mp3"}