Europe needs its own channels to the Kremlin

{"text":[[{"start":null,"text":"

"}],[{"start":7.08,"text":"The writer is director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin"}],[{"start":11.96,"text":"With yet another in-person summit between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin in the works, the war in Ukraine is reaching a new inflection point. The Kremlin is also signalling that it is more willing to generate risks and costs for Europe now that the continent provides the main lifeline for Kyiv’s self-defence. As Europe scrambles to deter Russian belligerence, there is one instrument glaringly absent from its toolkit: discreet channels of communication with the adversary."}],[{"start":46.550000000000004,"text":"Since February 2022, the west has seen several critical moments that could have spiralled into a direct confrontation between Russia and Nato. At every turn, the coalition used channels of communication to the Kremlin for risk management. Constant and discreet channels between seasoned US national security professionals and their Russian counterparts were always there to ensure that any Nato step to elevate support for Ukraine would be backed up by conflict diplomacy."}],[{"start":82.55000000000001,"text":"If an occurrence like the recent Russian drone incursions into Europe had happened a year ago, European leaders would have known that someone competent on the other side of the Atlantic would be working the phones with the Russians, making clear to them that an intentional mass casualty event in Europe would have dire consequences — and establishing some rules."}],[{"start":105.20000000000002,"text":"Now, however, Nato doesn’t have these channels at a senior level anymore — except, of course, for Trump and his lieutenants. The paradox is that, while rightfully demanding to be at the table when key European security issues are discussed, Europe is the only party that doesn’t have any regularised functional channels to the Russian security state and the Kremlin. Even Kyiv has them through intermediaries in the Middle East, and directly through negotiations with the Russians in Istanbul: the talks may be on ice for now, but the teams maintain communication lines."}],[{"start":142.24,"text":"Establishing a set of crisis management channels should be a no-brainer for Europe at a time when the risk of direct confrontation with Russia — including by miscalculation or accident — is rising, and when the Trump team often continues to keep the Europeans in the dark when dealing with the Kremlin. The new administration is also rapidly abandoning America’s traditional role as the adult in the room on the Russian threat."}],[{"start":168.47,"text":"This threat, beyond the horrors of the war in Ukraine itself, is increasingly acute for Europe. Take the recent drone attacks. In the Kremlin’s view, Kyiv’s defence machine relies on the many Ukrainian military production facilities hosted in its European rear — and now it’s high time to show that vulnerability. Drone incursions into Nato countries are meant to give Europeans a taste of their own medicine and cause a backlash against Ukraine. For now, this is having the opposite effect: European countries are taking anti-drone warfare more seriously, and some are doubling down on co-operation with Ukraine in response. However, the Kremlin’s ability to miscalculate should never be underestimated. If Putin sees that his strategy isn’t working, he could raise the stakes in more dangerous ways."}],[{"start":225.51999999999998,"text":"Moreover, even when the war eventually ends, adversarial relations with Europe may remain a fixture of Russian security policy for at least as long as Putin is in charge. Accordingly, the Kremlin’s attempts to damage the continent through hybrid means may outlive the war in Ukraine. The relative stability of conventional and nuclear deterrence between Nato and Russia has shifted confrontation to the hybrid domain, where rules of escalation management are not established. The Russians may try to push the envelope through trial and error — with potentially devastating consequences."}],[{"start":266.11,"text":"It’s understandable that the idea of talking to the Russian security state is divisive for the Europeans. Since 2022, sporadic attempts to do so have yielded little but frustration. There is also toxic baggage from the prewar era, when Berlin and Paris took the lead on dealing with Moscow, causing suspicion and backlash in Nato’s eastern flank countries. Very few current European leaders, including in the defence and security establishments, have experience of dealing with the Russians or are seen by them as credible. Moreover, before setting up channels, Europe will need to agree on a clearly defined agenda that should cover risk management with Moscow, as well as a set of guiding principles — while creating no surprises for the US."}],[{"start":318.59000000000003,"text":"But the radically changing environment makes these steps urgent. It’s high time for Europe to relearn the discipline of talking to its adversaries."}],[{"start":335.65000000000003,"text":""}]],"url":"https://audio.ftcn.net.cn/album/a_1761013160_4920.mp3"}